This study investigates the effects of political instability on inflation in Pakistan. Applying the Generalized Method of Moments and using data from 1951-2007, we examine this link in two different models. The results of the 'monetary' model suggest that the effects of monetary determinants are rather marginal and that they depend upon the political environment of Pakistan.
Introduction
In its sixty years of history, Pakistan has had a great deal of political instability ranging from dismissals, assassinations, coups, or cabinet changes. There could be little doubt then that this instability did not hamper Pakistan's policy formulation, implementation, or effectiveness such as attempts at macroeconomic stabilization. Political instability does not provide much room for the implementation or continuation of consistent or coherent policies. This greatly undermines the competence of a government and diminishes its resilience to accommodate shocks that eventually results in macroeconomic disequilibrium such as inflation.
The conventional view on political instability however, similar to weak-form Fiscal Theory of Price Level (FTPL) determination, is that it leads to high inflation due to governments' excessive reliance on seigneiorage. A logical indication of this mechanism, a high correlation between money and inflation, is indeed true for very high (hyper) inflation countries. But, this relationship might not hold for low or moderately high inflation countries like Pakistan. In such cases the predictions of strong-form FTPL, in which price level is determined irrespective of money growth, are more relevant. This is especially more pertinent when it is analyzed with some of the predictions of the theories of Political Economy of Macroeconomic Policy (PEMP) literature that actually contextualize the price level determination without money growth.
The empirical literature examining the inflation determinants in Pakistan does not consider political instability as a possible determinant in their models. 1 Out of about two dozen studies, more than half find inflation as a monetary phenomenon. These studies however do not take into account the problem of simultaneity, generally associated with a standard Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) method, thereby raising the possibility of inconsistent results.
Applying the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) and using data from 1951-2007, we investigate the effects of political instability on inflation in Pakistan in two different models. Our findings of the first, 'monetary', model imply that the effects of monetary determinants are rather marginal and that this effect crucially depends upon the political environment of Pakistan. The results of the second, 'nonmonetary', model explicitly establish the measures of political instability as important determinants of inflation in Pakistan. Further analyses based on interactive dummies reveal that political instability leads to above average inflation, more than others such as oil price.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical link between political instability and inflation with special emphasis on a country like Pakistan. Section 2 outlines the empirical strategy by describing the models and data. Section 3 presents and discusses the results of the estimated models. Concluding remarks follow in Section 4.
How Political Instability Leads to Inflation?
To show the link between political instability and inflation, we use a combination of the predictions of the FTPL determination and the PEMP literature. Following Carlstrom and Fuerst (1999) and (2000), the FTPL posits that price level and hence inflation is a result of the budgetary policies of the fiscal authorities. This is argued in two versions of weak-form FTPL and strongform FTPL. 2 The weak version akin to the famous monetarists' dictum, "inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon," argues that inflation is produced by excessive money growth dictated by the fiscal authorities and not the central bank. Thus, the underlying assumption here is the dominance of fiscal authorities in money creation. Whereas, the incentive for money creation is the revenue generation by printing money; that is, through seignorage.
Skeptics however argue that seignorage in reality does not account for as much of an amount of revenue collection so as to validate the aforementioned fiscal dominance assumption. This critique paves the way for the possibility of the dual dominance of both the fiscal and monetary authorities and thus the strong-form FTPL. The strong-form argues that fiscal policy independently affects the price level and hence the inflation rate; independent of the changes in money growth and dependent on the changes in government debt or budget deficit. . This implies, in this partial equilibrium setup, that for any future increase in budget surplus prices must fall down and for any future decrease in budget surplus (that is, increase in deficit) prices must rise to restore balance in the fiscal budget. Similarly, increase in the value of government debt would also raise price level and vice versa.
What would cause the budget deficit and government debt to increase or persist that actually leads to higher inflation rate in this set up? Two predictions from PEMP literature are relevant in this context. The first is the concept of 'political instability and deficit bias' as modeled by Alesina and Tabellini (1990) and the other is known as the 'war of attrition' as modeled by Alesina and Drazen (1991) .
The theory of 'political instability and deficit bias' argues that alternating governments are either uncertain of each others' preferences or they disagree over the composition of public spending that gives rise to excessively high budget deficits. Because it is in the interest of an incumbent policy maker to run high budget deficit so as to maximize the spending of its own preference and thereby limiting the spending of its successor's preference. This strategic interaction reflects adversely on society's intertemporal choices and results into suboptimal outcomes. Typically, the deficit bias is stronger the unstable is the political system or the greater is the likelihood of a government change.
Yet another channel of persistence or increase in deficit is the phenomenon of 'war of attrition' between conflicting political groups. A typical example to explain this is an unsustainable budget deficit. Even though it would be efficient to close down the deficit, a political agreement over this is often not found. This delay in fiscal stabilization may last until it becomes extremely costly for everybody. The reason in this delay has to do with asymmetric information among key political figures; that is, who bears the cost of stabilization? 3 Thus, the higher the number of political parties in a legislative council the higher the likelihood of conflict the harder to reach agreements and the more the persistence or increase in fiscal deficit. 3 A focused explanation of this phenomenon through a hypothetical example goes as follows. Consider a coalition government in office that comprises political parties A and B. The senior partner (party A) wishes to minimize a seemingly unsustainable budget deficit through the abandonment of generous pension-related expenditures. Party B, however, does not agree to this, as it is afraid to lose its substantial vote-bank that enjoys the privileges stemming from pension-related expenditures of the government. Thus, party A and party B is locked in a war of attrition and the delay in this stabilization may carry adverse economic consequences.
While both the theories of 'war of attrition' and 'political instability and deficit bias' focus on budget deficit, the basic idea of these theories can nonetheless be applied to any other variable such as public investment or government debt. In the absence of any binding fiscal rule and given the aforementioned political economy predictions the public investments are bound to swell through increase in government debt thus leading to inflation. More importantly, political instability undermines the effectiveness of a government in implementing consistent or coherent policies and weakens the state's hold on the management of economy. The bureaucracy, on the other hand, greatly benefits from this situation and remains unaccountable to the state organs. All this provides an accommodating framework for the promotion of corruption culture resulting in severe distortions. Apart from weakening the resilience of the economy in the case of exogenous shocks such as oil price, it also results in endogenous supply shocks such as food price hikes (for example, due to hoarding).
Relevance to Pakistan
Previous studies linking political instability to inflation have however reasoned otherwise; closer to the weak-form FTPL. Most notably, Cukierman et al. (1992) and more recently Aisen and Veiga (2006) argue that economies with political instability and weak institutions do not have efficient tax system that increases their reliance on seigniorage. Therefore, to meet the demand for public expenditures they end up printing excessive money that eventually leads to inflation.
We however argue that this line of reasoning might be true for very high (hyper) inflation countries but not for low or moderately high inflation countries. 4
Our argument is based on two studies by Moroney (2002) and DeGrauwe and Polan (2005) that test the one-on-one relationship between money and inflation in multi-country investigations. The former study separates countries into 'high-money-growth and high-inflation' and 'low-moneygrowth and low-inflation' categories. The first category is characterized by money growth exceeding real GDP growth by at least 15 percent and for the second category exceeding by less than 6 percent. He finds that one-on-one relationship is strongly supported in the first category and does not carry the same support in the second category. Similarly, the latter study confirms this result by separating countries into four categories characterized by annual average money (M1 and M2) growth rates of less than 15, 20, 30, and 100 percents. The one-on-one relationship 4 Aisen and Veiga (2006) in their empirical analysis define high inflation as a rate equal to or greater than 50 percent. Also note that the correlation coefficient, as reflected in Figure 1 , between CPI inflation and M2 growth during 1951-2007 has remained 20.1 percent. Therefore, the seigniorage factor as argued in the weak-form FTPL cannot be applied to a country like Pakistan; the combination of the predictions of the strong-form FTPL determination and PEMP literature are more relevant.
The Empirical Strategy and Data
Based on our discussion in the preceding section, without claiming to model inflation on some new lines of research, we propose two different estimable models. The first model is the summary of the empirical evidence already available on Pakistan economy and the second model stems from the 'nonmonetary' determinants of inflation literature. Furthermore, we use GMM estimation technique to tackle the limitations, such as simultaneity, of a standard OLS method. 6
The Models
In the first, monetary model, we estimate inflation on a host of explanatory variables stemming from the results of the empirical studies on Pakistan. Generally, as given in Appendix A, these studies have overwhelmingly termed inflation experience in Pakistan as a monetary phenomenon.
Therefore, based on these predictions our monetary model takes the following form: Note however that OLS estimates of Equation (1) would yield inconsistent estimates as there could be a problem of simultaneity. 7 To tackle this we apply the system-GMM methodology, wherein taking political instability as strong instrument(s). If the resulting estimates turn out to be significant as per the standard diagnostics then this result explicitly implies one important point:
without political instability a monetary model as Equation (1) does not provide an adequate explanation of inflation. Furthermore, a result of this kind also paves the way for nonmonetary determinants of inflation model.
This approach attempts to model inflation by focusing exclusively on the nonmonetary or 'deeper' determinants of inflation. The motivation for this approach can be understood by considering the case of strong-form FTPL described above. In effect, government's motivation, capacity, or effectiveness vis-à-vis management of the economy is essentially the deeper determinants of inflation. 8 Thus, applying the GMM methodology the nonmonetary determinants of inflation model in general can be given as follows:
( 2 ) 7 For example, Omer and Saqib (2008) argue that money (M2) is endogenous in Pakistan. 8 As an example, Cottarelli et al. (1998) argue that while inflation could be a monetary phenomenon it is more interesting to know why governments allow monetary expansion in the first place that actually cause inflation. See, also Aisen and Veiga (2006) and Hammermann (2007) . The former explains the world wide diversity in inflation experiences by also incorporating political instability and the latter focuses on the case of Romania. t W is strictly exogenous covariate vector of variables including a set of nonmonetary determinants, t PI is a vector of political instability measures, and t ε is the error term. We estimate Equation (2) as a baseline model and estimate it again with a set of interactive variables to capture the determinants of high (above average) inflation in Pakistan.
The Data
We use annual time series data for the years 1951 to 2007. The data we use broadly covers the economic and political environment of Pakistan. Unless mentioned otherwise, data source is the 
Significance of Political Instability Variables to Pakistan
With reference to Pakistan's experience Polity actually never reaches to any of its extreme values of either +10 or -10. This degree of political instability and uncertainty as in the aforementioned variables for Pakistan is greatly reflected in the frequent changes in the heads of state and prime ministers. As presented in Appendix B, in its sixty years history Pakistan has had a fairly large number of executive changes with forty-one heads of state and prime ministers; notably, there have been twenty-five prime ministers to this date. Apart from this, there are two important points to note in the same table. First, a large majority of the Pakistani executives had rather short stints in the office.
Second, the tenures of many did not end as a result of some routine change, such as elections; for a majority, the exit has been unceremonious such as dismissals.
A noteworthy aspect of political instability in Pakistan is that Government crises and Cabinet changes are associated more with democratic regimes than the autocratic ones. As presented in Table 2 , the Polity index with positive values, signifying the regimes with more democratic characteristics, shows more instability than the Polity with negative values.
Although Pakistan does not have a history of runaway inflation, it has experienced some episodes of high inflation rates. In fifty-seven years from 1951 to 2007, the inflation remained in doubledigit in fourteen years and some of those years coincide with oil price shocks. Taking the sample average of 6.99 percent as a benchmark of high inflation then it was in twenty-six years that inflation was recorded more than this average; most notably from 1973 to 1982, 1991 to 1998, and more recently from 2005 to 2007. All these years coincide more with Polity with positive values; that is more with Government crises and Cabinet changes. Analyzing therefore Polity with monthly CPI variability reveals interesting pattern. 9 As shown in Figure 2 , the trend line of the scatter plot between Polity and monthly CPI variability is upward sloping. This signifies that the more the democratic a regime in Pakistan, the higher the variability in CPI. In other words, Government crises and Cabinet changes are associated with an upward CPI variability.
The Results
Estimation results for the monetary model as outlined in Section 3 are given in The impact of these variables however is very small as compared to those argued by several empirical studies on Pakistan (as presented in Appendix A).
In particular, if the sample average inflation is 6.99 percent then one percent increase in M2, Credit, and Fiscal balance would raise inflation rate by 0.50, 0.16, and 0.38 percentage points to 7.49, 7.17, and 7.37 percents respectively. By far the most pronounced result in this estimate is of the inflation inertia: a percent increase in lagged inflation would raise sample average inflation rate of 6.99 percent by 4.30 percentage point to 11.29 percent.
The The results of our second model of nonmonetary determinants of inflation as in Section 3 are presented in Table 4 . The technical conditions in both specifications of this model, as reflected in the standard diagnostics, are acceptable. Including lagged inflation, the lagged values of other determinants are used as instruments. Similar to our estimation results in Table 3 ; all the explanatory variables are statistically significant.
The results of Specification I confirm the first-order impact of nonmonetary determinants on inflation. As can be seen, relatively the political environment variables carry more sizeable impact than that of the economic variables. Among the economic variables the most striking result is of the Oil price and of the Trade share. Contrary to the popular perception of oil price shocks aggravating inflation, the coefficient in our estimate is rather marginal at 2.4 percent only.
Similarly, the conventional wisdom that more openness of trade leads to lesser inflation does not hold true for Pakistan. The coefficient of Trade share is with positive sign and with a considerable impact of about 20.7 percent.
The impact of GDP per capita in reducing inflation is rather pronounced at -26.2 percent;
whereas, the effects of Agriculture output in reducing inflation is rather small at -1.5 percent. Another noteworthy result of this estimate is the coefficient of the lagged inflation that actually reduces in size to 29.8 percent from 61.6 percent of the estimate as in Table 3 . This signifies the reduction in the explanatory power of lagged inflation due to the inclusion of other variables, such as those of political environment.
As for the effects of political instability are concerned, they confirm their sizably increasing effects on inflation. With every increase in Government crises and an additional change in Cabinet, inflation increases by 25 and 41.1 percents. Clearly, Cabinet changes have by far the largest contribution towards inflation acceleration in this set up. Perhaps, the most intriguing result is the positive sign associated with the Polity scale; that is, the more the Pakistan moves towards the democratic form of government the more inflation increases. This is in contrast to what a conventional understanding would argue; since a democratic form of government ensures economic freedom and a systematic way of governance. While we agree with this, we nonetheless argue that this might not hold for a country like Pakistan that exhibits a unique characteristic in this respect. In its sixty years history, the maximum number of Government crises and Cabinet changes has taken place during the democratic regimes of 1951-1958, 1985-1999, and 2003-2007 (Table 2) . This is also evident in Appendix B: during these periods there have been twenty-one Prime Ministers out of a total of twenty-five. Indeed, with this degree of instability under democratic regimes, a positive association of Polity with inflation should not be a surprising result.
What Leads to High Inflation in Pakistan?
We now turn to analyze the individual contributions of various determinants towards high inflation. We define above sample average inflation rate as 'high' inflation in Pakistan, which is 6.99 percent during 1951-2007. We discard monetary growth as a potential cause of high inflation in Pakistan because of our results in Table 1 ; since the acceptance of M2 growth as a determinant of inflation is a possibility because of political environment.
The political environment variables are interacted with dummy variables accounting for inflation above the aforementioned sample average; that is, the same inflation rate for the years when it was above 6.99 percent, zero otherwise. The results are presented in Specification II of Table 3 .
All the interactive and non-interactive variables are statistically significant with consistent signs.
Only Agriculture output changes its sign in this Specification; but, its coefficient remains marginal. This however is not the case with GDP per capita that apart from retaining its negative sign increases in size. Trade share remains nearly the same with its positive sign and size of the coefficient. Another noteworthy change in II from I is the reduction in the coefficient of lagged inflation from 0.298 percent to 0.135 percent.
The interactive political environment variables while retaining their respective signs change in their effects. In particular, Polity and Cabinet changes reduce to 0.040 and 0.051 from 0.192 and 0.411 percent respectively; whereas, Government crises increase to a sizeable 0.715 from 0.250 in Specification I. Interestingly, the increase in Oil price variable remains negligible at 0.001.
Therefore, by far the most distinct result is of Government crises and not of Oil price.
Specifically, when inflation is above average an additional Government crises increase it by 0.715. Thus, political instability as in Government crises has the most insightful effect on inflation in situations of high (above average) inflation.
Concluding Remarks
Although our finding of a positive association between political instability and inflation are in line with that of Aisen and Veiga (2006) , we differ with them in reasoning and in some fine interpretation of results. We argue that a combination of the predictions of strong Price and Nasim (1999 ) 1974 -1994 Dependant: CPI and exchange rate. Independent: M2, world price, GDP, forex reserves PPP and money demand are identified through cointegration Ahmad and Ali (1999 ) 1982 Dependent: CPI, exchange rate. Independent: M2, GDP, import price, world price, forex reserves, exchange rate M2 is significant Shamsuddin and Holmes (1997 ) 1972 -1994 CPI, broad money, real output No cointegrating relationship Nasim (1997 Nasim ( ) 1974 Nasim ( -1994 Dependent: GDP deflator, CPI inflation. Independent: M2, foreign price, GDP, interest rate M2 is highly significant Khan and Qasim (1996 ) 1972 Dependant: CPI inflation, food inflation, non-food inflation. Independent: agriculture output, real GDP, wheat support price, utility price, import price index, interest rate, money supply
Money supply, real GDP, import price, agriculture output, wheat support price, utility price are all significant Chaudhary and Ahmad (1996 ) 1972 -1992 Dependant: CPI inflation. Independent: M2, GDP growth, share of service sector, public debt, import price M2 and other are significant Hasan et al. (1995 Hasan et al. ( ) 1973 Hasan et al. ( -1994 Dependant: Price index of food, manufacturing, and raw material. Independent: supply shock, money supply, procurement price, external price, expectations
Money supply insignificant for food and weakly significant for manufacturing and raw material Dhakal and Kandil (1993 ) 1970 -1987 Dependant: CPI inflation. Independent: M1, industrial production, interest rate, foreign interest rate, import price M1 is insignificant Ahmad and Ram (1991 ) 1960 -1988 Dependant: WPI, CPI, GNP deflator. Independent: real GNP growth, growth rate of unit value of imports, growth in M1/M2, lagged inflation
Real GNP growth, growth rate of unit value of imports, nominal money growth, lagged inflation are significant Hossain (1990 Hossain ( ) 1961 Hossain ( -1988 Dependant: inflation. Independent: output, money, government debt
Money is highly significant
